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Is the Moral Dimension of Fiduciary Duty Law
Relevant to Teaching and Law Practice?
The Social Responsibility of
Corporate Law Professors
Lyman PQ. Johnson*
Most tatments of corporate social responsibility focus on the responsibilities of
corporate decision makers or their advisors Professor Johnson argues that corporate law
professors-the persons who educate the students who will become lawyers counseling
corporate decision makers-also have a sociaresponsibihty. He believes thatprofessors should
find various ways to raise the subject of corporate social responsibity in the basic corporations
course, and he advocates rejecting a classroom approach that addresses only shareholder-
manager relations Afier describing several possible ways to do this, Professor Johnson
spotlights fiduciary lawas a fhiitul area to enrich student understandings of director dutiesin a
way that encompasses socially sharednorms ofloyalty and care. With broader understandings
of those key notions, lawyers may counsel corporate decision makers-and decision makers
may act-in a ay that results in more socially acceptable and responsible corporate conduct
In this iwy, corporate lawprofessors can fulfill, not abdicate, theirown responsibiities.
Everyone thinks of changing the worl4 but no one thinks of changing
himself
-Leo Tolstoy
As I think about law professors and corporate social
responsibility, my thoughts turn to sports and to civil rights lawyers. I
ask myself whether I want to study corporate social responsibility
detachedly or whether I want to (and can) play a role in shaping
corporate social responsibility. I will not undertake to do the latter
unless there is some realistic likelihood of genuinely making a
difference. After all, I might want to play baseball for the Yankees, but
why bother thinking about it, except in a Walter Mitty-like way,
because it will never happen. At the same time, that does not mean
that I can only watch or study others; I can still play baseball in my
backyard, golf, exercise regularly, and otherwise directly participate in
sports on a more local scale. Can law professors likewise directly
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participate in the attainment of more socially responsible corporate
conduct? What is our "arena" for involvement?
Civil rights lawyers in the 1950s and 1960s engaged in, and
public interest lawyers still engage in, the struggle to advance civil
rights and other causes thought to be in the general public interest.
Sure, they studied the relevant legal issues and drew on the work of
those who had studied the issues in even greater depth. But then they
acted to effectuate change. They were "activists." Can corporate law
professors who care about corporate social responsibility effectuate
change? Can we, should we, be "activists?"
My answer is "yes." Law professors can shape corporate social
responsibility and can do so without necessarily leaving law schools.
In fact, we are fashioning corporate social responsibility already, by
doing so little. How much corporate law scholarship in the last few
years has addressed issues of corporate social responsibility? How
much of that scholarship acknowledges, draws on, or engages the
social responsibility scholarship originating in business schools or
elsewhere? More importantly, how much classroom time do we law
professors devote to engaging our students to reflect on issues of
corporate social responsibility?' If the answer to these questions is
"not much," then we are influencing corporate responsibility in just
that way. We are stating, in effect, either that things are as they ought
to be, or, if they are not, that it is none of our business. Who, me?
I think it is the social responsibility of corporate law professors to
challenge law students, in varied and sustained ways, to reflect on
basic issues of corporate social responsibility. As future lawyers
counseling corporate decision makers, they will draw from us a good
measure of what they believe to be the proper role, professional
responsibility, and ambit of concern of corporate lawyers. I think,
therefore, in a post-Enron world we cannot escape being more
"activist.' Not, I hasten to add, for the purpose of advocating
particular views on corporate responsibility in the hopes that students
1. SeegenerallyRobert B. Thompson, The Basic BusinessAssociations Course: An
Empirical Study of Methods and Conten4 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438 (1998) (discussing the
basic law school business associations course). Professor Thompson's article gathers useful
information on topics commonly taught in the basic course, but does not indicate what
contentis covered. Id. at 439-40. It appears that the topicof corporate social responsibility is
not commonly covered, but perhaps it is treated as an aspect of other topics. See id.
Treatment of corporate "stakeholders" may be an example. Id. at 445; see, e.g., Hillary A.
Sale, Of Corporate Suffrage, Social Responsibility, and Layered Law: Teaching Basic
Business Law Through Federal Securities Law, 34 GA. L. REv 809, 820-21 (2000)




will go on as lawyers to implement our views. Here the civil rights
lawyer parallel breaks down. They were activists advocatingparticular
views. I suggest that law professors be activists in raising various
views of corporations and their role in society in a more systematic
way.
Within the corporate law academy, proponents of the
contractarian theory of corporate relationships have declared victory
through Professor Stephen Bainbridge:
Over the last few decades, law and economics scholars have
mounted a largely successful hostile takeover of the corporate legal
academy.
The law and economics movement remains the most successful
example of intellectual arbitrage in the history of corporate
jurisprudence.
Most law and economics scholars embrace a model of business
organizations known as the "nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.' 2
In a subsequent letter Professor Bainbridge adds a new, stronger
claim and one pertinent to this Essay: "[L]aw and economics is also
taking over the law schools. My sense is that it is getting very hard to
get a job as a corporate law teacher without having a law and
economics background. At least this seems to be true among the 'top'
schools"3 Although Bainbridge explicitly addresses only the growing
prevalence of "law and econ" professors, the phrase "taking over the
law schools" suggests a cunicularpredominance as well.4
Once a corporation is theoretically conceived of as a nexus of
contracts, corporate governance goes on to concern itself with one
central relationship in particular, the shareholder-manager strand. The
subject of corporate governance being so defined and, I guess, the law
school course of corporate law being correspondingly organized, with
casebooks and the customary selection of topics reflecting this, the
topic of corporate social responsibility, if addressed at all, lacks a
2. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Comnumiy and Sta'sm: A Conservative Conliacitaan
Critique ofProgressive Corporate Law Scholarstp, 82 CoRNELLL. REv. 856, 857-59 (1997)
(book review). The current period in corporate law theory may be an example of what Grant
Gilmore calls a classical period when law is (or seeks to be) "neat, tidy and logical." GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (1974). This is in contrast to those romantic
periods, which is the classical alternate, when detailed rules are disfavored. See id.
3. ROBERT W HAIILTON, CORrORATIONs 23 (7th ed. 2001) (emphasis added)




theoretical niche.! Consequently, it appears as sort of an "add on"
component that is not easily integrated into the basic course as a
whole. This also may be why mainstream corporate law scholars have
been relatively silent about recent corporate scandals, as outrage pours
in from many quarters.
One wonders whether even that determined group of scholars
who persistently object to the bargain model of corporate relationships
in our scholarship has succumbed to that very model in how we teach
our corporate law courses.6 I believe that we who profess concern
about corporate social responsibility should ask whether we practice
what we preach in the classroom. I also think that the arena where
corporate law teachers can play the greatest role in spotlighting and
enhancing corporate social responsibility is, quite simply, the devotion
of greater classroom attention to the subject. In the years ahead, I
think the untapped potential of the basic corporations course to serve
as a vehicle for exploring social responsibility will attract the sort of
attention that will make for exciting pedagogy. In this Essay, I briefly
say why I think corporate law teachers should tend to this and how, in
my own limited, halting way, I am starting to rethink what I do in the
classroom.
No one, before or after September 1 lth, or the collapse of Enron
and WorldCom, could seriously dispute that the activities of
corporations are central to our society's well being. Teachers must ask
themselves, and find creative ways to probe with their students, the
question of whether the bonds between and among corporate
participants, and those whose lives are significantly molded by
corporate activity, are fully captured in the "nexus-of-contracts" (or
bargain) model of corporate relationships. Corporate law scholarship
5. Professor Kent Greenfield has pointed out how little material on social
responsibility there is in the most popular corporate casebooks. Kent Greenfield, There" a
Forest in Those Trees: TeachingAbout the Role of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REv.
1011, 1011 n.1 (2000). This neglect might flow naturally from the "nexus-of-contracts"
conception of corporateness because, as a marketplace rather than a moralmlegal actor, the
corporation is thought to have no social responsibility. See Lynne L. Dallas, Tho Models of
Corporate Governance: BeyondBerle andMeans, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORi. 19, 30 (1988)
(noting authority).
6. Notable examples of professors who have written about how they teach corporate
social responsibility are Professors Kent Greenfield, supra note 5, and Kellye Y. Testy, Adding
Value(s) to Corporate La"w: An Agenda for Reform, 34 GA. L. REv 1025, 1031-44 (2000).
Professor Lynne Dallas's forthcoming book on teaching socio-economics, which includes a
chapter on corporate social responsibility, will give teaching in this area a huge boost. LYNNE
DALLAS, LAW & Socio-EcoNoMics (forthcoming 2002).
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may be one of the few places in America where that model is thought
to be both accurate and morally unobjectionable.
Sociologist Alan Wolfe, in recently asking whether we now live in
a "postloyalty world" wherein we suffer a chronic "loyalty deficit,"
neatly captured the contrast between the views of ordinary citizens and
a purely economic model of business! Wolfe stated:
This emphasis that so many Americans place on the personal side of
business practice runs up against the way most economists and
defenders of business treat the issue of corporate loyalty. Institutions
are not, in the view of the latter, like people, subject to emotions,
possessing a potential for empathy, and capable of dialogue. Rather,
corporations, to be efficient, must act rationally, dedicated to doing
whatever is best for stockholders, irrespective of the impact of those
decisions on those, like employees, who have a personal stake in the
company's future. ... As free market economists see the world, a
company forced to let employees go, no matter how loyal those
employees may have been in the past, is just responding to the
impersonal logic of the market. Market discipline leaves companies no
choice but to act efficiently, whatever the spill-over effects may be with
respect to loyalty.
This way of thinking rubs many Americans the wrong way.
A theoretical perspective on corporate relationships that
advocates a focus on short-term shareholder welfare is, according to
sociologist Richard Sennett, "a principle which corrodes trust, loyalty,
and mutual commitment?' 9 Just such a prescriptive focus, however, is
often assumed to be proper in the orthodoxy of corporate governance.
Thus, theoretical conceptions of corporate relations are not purely
descriptive; they can also alter, in normatively controversial ways, the
very social landscape they purport to observe.
Possibly, however, it is not just contractarian scholars but also
corporate decision makers themselves who think they are not supposed
to, or cannot, overtly act in socially responsible ways. Perhaps this is
because the bargain model of corporate relations accurately captures a
segment of a more general bargain model of social relations and,
consequently, contractarian scholars simply have located the corporate
institution in an even larger theoretical understanding of social bonds.
In other words, perhaps familial, educational, athletic, and a host of
7. ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM: THE IMPOSSIBLE IDEA THAT DEFINES THE WAY
WE Lm ENow 37, 56 (2001).
S. Id at 30-31.
9. RICHARD SENNEr, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 24 (1998).
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other social interactions, along with business relations, are increasingly
being conceptualized as "bargained for" in nature. Alternatively, the
causal direction runs the other way. Possibly the very breakdown of
loyalty in the business sphere and the accompanying rise of the bargain
model in framing business relations may mean the "emphasis on
putting one's own interest first... in the economy" carries over from
the business arena into the realm of family and other social relations.'"
The altered social-moral environment may, in turn, reinforce corporate
decision makers' belief that they act consistently with larger social
norms by conceiving corporate conduct as purely contractual and self-
interested in nature; in fact, their conduct may corrode those norms.
Only recently as a professor have I begun to wonder whether I
sufficiently explore in classroom sessions, and in more informal out-
of-class discussions, what students really think about this conception
of business and social interaction. If life is a series of bargains,
perhaps I should ask students, then aren't we humans always (rightly)
seeking to advance our own individual interests? And our personal
well-being depends on our success at bargaining, does it not? And
that, in turn, depends on the endowments with which we have to
bargain and on our capacity to identify and satisfy needs and desires of
those from whom we, in turn, seek things, does it not? And so on. The
upshot of this outlook, in short, is that reciprocity and cooperation in
fully-bargained-for social relations will endure only so long as each
actor believes that what is received equals or exceeds what is given in
"exchange." Given short shrift in this account, however, are the series
of "involuntary" relationships in which we all stand. We do not select
our family of origin, the particulars of our children (as of 2002), those
persons at work who are hired after us, the neighbors who move in
later, etc. Nor do we terminate all relationships where we believe we
"give" more than we "get." In some interactions-think here of a
rescue worker in New York or Washington, D.C. on September 11 th-
there may be little expectation of "getting" anything. Not all
relationships, in other words, business or otherwise, are wholly self-
created or voluntary or fragile, except in the very limited sense that the
"exit" option may not always be exercised.
I think many law students, like many people in society at large,
believe human actors are both more complex and more irrational than
the contractarian metaphor allows. Insights from psychology and
sociology support this view. Recent work in behavioral law and
10. WOLFE, supM note 7, at 48.
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economics also validates this impression." Certainly, instances of
disinterested generosity and outright self-sacrifice have occurred with
sufficient frequency, before and after September 1 Ith, to challenge the
simple bargain metaphor. Moreover, possibly many law students
(perhaps even those who believe the bargain model is descriptively
accurate) are, consistent with Alan Wolfe's observations about the
citizenry at large, nonetheless disenchanted with such a view and may
even yearn for a model of social bonds that transcends the calculated
pursuit of self-interest.'2 But how will we know, and how will they
know, if we professors do not challenge them to grapple with this
issue? How can we expect them to have, or reflect on whether they
might desire, an alternative conception of corporate relations if we do
not provide any?
In short, corporate relations are socio-economic relations, and our
conceptions of human interaction in the one sphere will both shape
and be shaped by our notions of interaction in the other. Thinking
about social relations as a nexus of contracts is relatively new, at least
on such a widespread basis. Contractarians in corporate law may be
claiming victory in the law journals. " Unless the bargain conception
of business relationships is simply different than the nature of all other
social relations, however, one tack for corporate law teachers and
students seeking to raise questions about the descriptive accuracy and
prescriptive appeal of that model of corporate relations is to be creative
in identifying other models of human association, including instances
of reluctance to embrace the bargain model, both in law and in other
social endeavors.
Activating classroom consideration of corporate social
responsibility may and should, of course, proceed on a number of
fronts, including a fresh reexamination of the very scope,
methodology, and appropriate topics for inclusion in what customarily
has been called corporate social responsibility. My point is that to
overcome its perennial status on the periphery of the corporate law
course, its treatment, initially at least, may best be linked to an
embracing or rejecting of a larger theoretical model of corporate
relations, or at least otherwise fitted into the existing edifice of
11. SeeJames A. Fanto, Braking the MergerMomentum: Reforming CorporateLaw
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BuFF. L. RE v 249, 288 n.119 (2001) (collecting recent
literature on this topic).
12. See WOLFE, supra note 7, at 54.
13. See Bainbridge, supra note 2.
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corporate governance concepts. One such concept is that of fiduciary
duty.
The relatively new theoretical "bargain" paradigm coexists,
uneasily, with the continuing legacy in corporate law of a moral-
sounding vocabulary in doctrinal fiduciary discourse; a vocabulary
formed in an era when corporate relations were not coined in contract
terms. The central notions of "care," "loyalty," and "good faith" carry
significant social, literary, and moral meaning outside corporate law
discourse. Corporate law contractarians earnestly deny the moral
footing of this received professional discourse, seeking either to render
it innocuous or to recast it into the discourse of finance and
economics, with talk of "bargain" and "agency costs;' etc.'4 To be
sure, the economic perspective on "corporateness" is important and
necessary; the issue is whether in teaching corporate law one or
another mode of discourse will supplant all others, including those
more hospitable to the idea of corporate social responsibility.
The historic deployment within corporate law doctrine of a
moral-sounding vocabulary suggests a widespread belief, at least at
one time, that a moral subject matter was involved. One can hardly
imagine richer, more evocative, social-moral notions than "care,"
"loyalty" and "good faith.' In spite of recent contractarian efforts to
"translate" these deep-rooted terms into a finance/economic dialect,
the project must acknowledge a fundamental tension: unlike the
theoretical underpinnings of the contractarian model, these core
doctrinal notions are inescapably "other regarding" not self-interested,
in orientation. As a matter of cultural-linguistic practice, these terms
were not designed to describe the conduct of persons, including
corporate decision makers, instrumentally conceived of as calculating,
economic functionaries rationally advancing self-interest, either in
freely contracting over the very rules of corporate governance or in
acting within the governance regime supposedly "bargained" for. They
aim, rather, to prescribe unselfish behavior. Moreover, in spite of
current scholarly efforts in this direction, these notions should not be
blithely dismissed as simply masking, in high-sounding altruistic
rhetoric, behavior that in fact is forward-looking and instrumentally
calculated to "signal" trustworthiness for the self-interested (and self-
deceiving) purpose of inducing others to transact future business with
14. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contact and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425,427 (1993).
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the actor." The tenacious normative commitment to an exclusively
self-serving account of human behavior dismisses the morally and
socially responsible dimension of economic activity (and the tenor of
fiduciary discourse) by insisting that action supposedly taken out of a
normative commitment to others' welfare inevitably is rooted in self-
interest.'" We simply as yet, we are told, have "no psychological
account" to explain how or why such self-serving conduct gets
translated into moral-sounding rhetoric about "responsible" conduct."
In short, according to this account, our other-regarding terms of
discourse hinder understanding of social interaction more than they
help.
Criticism about the moral flavor of fiduciary discourse can also
come from an altogether different quarter. Here the claim is not that,
historically or linguistically speaking, the discourse does not have a
prescriptive social-moral aspect. Nor is the claim that such discourse
should not have a social-moral bent. Rather, the concern is whether
today, with a weakened belief in traditional sources of moral authority,
cultural norms are sufficiently widely and strongly shared that it is
even possible to attain consensus on whether and how corporate
decision makers should responsibly consider the legitimate interests of
others. In short, can concepts originating in a time when biblical,
literary, and philosophical virtues were more widely shared remain
important without continuing broad assent to those same foundations?
Alan Wolfe's interviews with numerous Americans reveal that
indeed many citizens have lost touch with the traditional religious
language of morality." People now look to many sources for guidance,
including religion, but also to other serious books and artistic works.'9
Wolfe found that many people feel let down by those very institutions,
such as churches, businesses, and schools, supposedly established on
traditional moral virtues." The result in contemporary society is a
sense of disappointment and disenchantment, on the one hand, and a
newfound sense of "moral freedom," on the other.2' The new emphasis
15. See Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REv. 1821,
1832-33 (2000).
16. See id
17. Seeid. at 1832.
18. See Jane Lampman, Interview/Alan Wolfe: "en Morals Bend to Personal
Choice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30,2001, at 13.
19. See id. In the aftermath of September 11 th, there is strong evidence that people
are (re)turning to religion for comfort and to help them make sense of that tragedy. Sales of





on "moral freedom," in which people determine for themselves what it
means to lead a good and virtuous life, is to be distinguished, notes
Wolfe, from "moral anarchy," in which people do whatever they want.2
This sociological assessment of the state of moral authority in
contemporary society has relevance for corporate social responsibility,
as viewed through the lens of fiduciary discourse.23 In a modem
culture of "moral freedom" such freedom will find expression in the
business sphere, both in the larger social arena of corporate global
influence and in the corporation's own internal, moral climate.
Although many individuals will exercise that moral freedom in an
array of corporate activities, none will do so with more power or with
greater influence on the ethical tone of the business than directors and
senior officers. What terms do they use as they think and talk about
how they make decisions?
These key corporate actors live in the same culture, grappling
with the vertigo of moral freedom as we all do. They too find moral
guidance in religion, philosophy, literature, lore, and general cultural
understandings. Today, as a hundred years ago, they still read, hear
about, see, and otherwise directly experience instances of loyalty, care,
and good faith, and their opposites. They carry with them, in differing
ways to be sure, some experience and understanding of what those
social norms (virtues) mean. Thirty years from now, directors and
senior officers likewise will have an understanding of these social-
moral norms, unless, as is unlikely, they vanish altogether from our
social-moral landscape. Both today and, one hopes, in thirty years,
corporate directors also will read about and hear from their corporate
legal counsel that they have a legal duty to act with good faith, loyalty,
and care. One would think a director's understanding of those notions
as social norms would influence how he or she understands them as
legal duties. That is, directors, upon hearing counsel's advice to be
22. Id.
23. By "corporate social responsibility," I mean both the corporation's influence on
"externals," such as the environment, the impact of its products and services on consumers
and others, and its large-scale shaping of other "social" and cultural interests, as well as a
corporation's own "internal" ethical culture. In nonlegal settings, apparently only the former
is considered "corporate social responsibility," while the latter falls under the rubric of
"business ethics" W. Michael Hoffman, Remarks to the Canadian Business Ethics Summit
in Toronto, Canada, on Sept. 15, 1999, available at http://ecampus.bentley.edu/dept/cbe/
20year/cbe20toc.htm (last visited June 27, 2002). Recently it was observed that "these
approaches have not yet found appropriate ways to interrelate, or even to interact, with each
other." Id This mirrors a dichotomy similar to that noted earlier about how corporate social
responsibility, if addressed at all, is treated separately from corporate governance in the basic
law school corporations course.
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loyal and to fulfill their duty of good faith and care, undoubtedly bring
to these words their own individual and diverse recollection of
teaching, stories, drama, poetry, preaching, personal experience, and
other sources wherein the larger, exemplary norms of care, loyalty, and
good faith were modeled and transmitted. Such "legal" advice, being
couched in terms that, by the psychological process of association,
serve to remind the hearer of a richer, moral-social meaning, can result
in director action going beyond the legal minimum toward behavior
genuinely seeking to care for and be loyal to the corporate enterprise.
This may be a reason to preserve the moral flavor of corporate
law discourse; by infusing the concepts of care and loyalty with social-
moral-experiential meaning, lay people may endow those concepts
with more significance than the legal minimum (i.e., duty) transmitted
by lawyers. The result might be an upgrading of conduct beyond the
minimum needed to avoid legal sanction, possibly approaching a
standard closer to prevailing social expectations of responsible
conduct. Alternatively, if the legal duties of loyalty, care, and good
faith are conveyed by lawyers as being "smaller" than those norms
prevailing generally in the social milieu, then a downgrading of
conduct may result. In other words, how an individual director and the
board of directors (as a body) understand good faith, care, and loyalty
as legal duties (i.e., as robust or shrunken) will presumably shape
action that, through the corporate institution, over time will lead to
more or less socially responsible conduct. That conduct, in turn, will
help influence the public's perception of the state of overall
institutional morality. Indeed, Alan Wolfe found just such a connection
between corporate conduct and public disillusionment when he
observed that "[n]o other institution in American life provokes such
bittersweet reflections of loyalty lost as the business corporation.'
24
Both now and in the future, consequently, those who counsel
directors can be seen to play a key social role in mediating the realms
of legal duty and social norms through their explanation of notions like
care, loyalty, and good faith that form part of the basic vocabulary of
both realms. These people are corporate lawyers. The people who
introduce them to the language of corporate law are law professors.
There are many ways for corporate law professors to promote
broader-ranging, in-class exploration of corporate social responsibility.
Lynne Dallas's recent pedagogical work in socio-economics, presented
at the 2002 annual American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
24. WOLFE, supra note 7, at 26.
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conference, is one excellent example."5 Kent Greenfield has suggested
another good approach-teach the case of Local 1330 v United States
Steel Corp.6 For many years, on the second day of class, I have
expressly raised four questions that I ask students to ponder throughout
the semester, questions to which on several later occasions I explicitly
link class material. They are:
Whatis the proper purpose(s) of corporate endeavor?
WMydo you answer the above question as you do?
How can that purpose better be attained?
Who should participate in deciding the answers to the above
questions?
I still regularly pose, discuss, and refer back to these questions.
More recently, however, I also have chosen fiduciary duty discourse as
an avenue to ask students about the responsibilities of corporate
decision makers who, as students learn in corporate law, have legal
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.
I believe, as stated earlier, that the core fiduciary notions of care,
loyalty, and good faith have a richness as social-moral norms that is
not captured in the expression of those notions as legal duties. Unless
the richer meaning somehow conflicts with or impedes discharge of a
legal duty, a decision maker fulfilling her legal duty is free to do so in
a way that also advances shared social norms. If so, then law
professors, who introduce future lawyers to the professional lexicon,
should be careful not to truncate the vocabulary, thereby leading future
lawyers to internalize and transmit a professional norm "smaller" than
the norm prevailing outside legal discourse."
Communicating to law students a shrunken interpretation of core
notions inevitably will influence how, as lawyers, those students go on
to convey those same notions to corporate decision makers. The result
will be that decision makers may feel inhibited in bringing their
broader cultural understandings of these concepts to the performance
of their responsibilities. Instead, they will, through the way legal
counsel expresses legal duties, struggle to "translate" their broader
understandings into law talk. The opportunity, or "moral freedom," not
only to comply with legal duties, but also to promote social-moral
25. See DALLAS, supr note 6.
26. See Greenfield, supra note 5, at 1020-24.
27. In a wholly different context discussing tenure, Professor Robert Ashford has
suggested that law teachers themselves might be "fiduciaries." Robert Ashford, Law Teachers
as Fiduciaries: A Socio-Economic Take on Tenure, Remarks at Symposium on the Socio-
Economics of Professional Responsibility, 10th International Conference on Socio-
Economics, Vienna, Austria (July 16, 1998).
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norms responsibly may be lost. This opportunity will be missed
because something was lost in the "translation," both the translation in
the boardroom and the earlier one in the classroom, where professors
launch into legal discourse about care, loyalty, and good faith without
linking corporate law's rendering of those concepts to richer
understandings brought into the classroom from other sources.
I will not repeat an argument I have made elsewhere as to
precisely how "care" and "loyalty" are fuller-bodied than we in
corporate law often remember." Briefly, however, with respect to care,
philosopher Martin Heidigger described care as so primordial that
"[b]eing must be defined as care.'29 And, as seen in the well-known
story of the Good Samaritan, we are told that the Samaritan changed
his travel plans and "took care of" a wounded stranger. Indeed, the
World Book Dictionary lists nine different meanings of the word
"care. " It is, in short, a concept that pervades our everyday social
discourse and one that is thought to be unqualifiably good.
With respect to loyalty, one key inquiry, both within corporate
law discourse and in other realms, is to ask whether that notion means
only nonbetrayal or whether it includes, and indeed demands,
affirmative devotion to the well-being of another. By way of example,
when we say of a man that he is a "loyal husband" do we mean only
that he does not betray his wife in that he does not commit adultery, or
do we mean, in addition, that he is affirmatively devoted to advancing
the well-being of his wife?
Drawing on understandings of care and loyalty as derived from
other discourses and from our own everyday cultural understandings
can usefully enrich a student's understanding of corporate law's effort
to construe and use those terms. Doing so may lead to the following
points. First, loyalty, both as a social norm outside of corporate law
and as a mandatory corporate law duty, includes the minimum
condition of nonbetrayal and some context-sensitive degree of
affirmative devotion. Second, although care has several meanings as a
social norm outside of corporate law, within corporate law the duty of
care has come to mean only that a director must act in a certain
procedurally "careful" manner. This did not need to happen-there
28. See Lyman Johnson, AfterEnron: LoyaltyDiscoursein Corpomte Law, 28 DEL.
J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2003); Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director
Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 808-10 (1999).
29. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 238 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962) (1927).
30. WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY (2001).
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are two other dimensions of care that are relevant to corporate law. For
example, title 8, section 141(a) of the Delaware Code places the
business and affairs of a corporation under the "direction" of a board
of directors." "Direction" means "the guidance or supervision of
action [or] conduct," which is also one meaning of "care" as in the
phrase "under a doctor's care."'32 In corporate law then, by statute, the
business and affairs of a corporation are "under the board of directors'
care." Director neglect of corporate affairs, or a director's abdication
of his or her duties, is a violation of care in this most fundamental,
statutory sense. It is a failure to direct, or "take care of," the
corporation.
In addition to taking "care of" a corporation's business and
affairs, a board is expected to "care for" the interests of the corporate
enterprise and its shareholders. That is, the affirmative object of
director attention and energy must be the enterprise and its
shareholders, not the directors' interests or those of any disinterested
third party. Unconsidered director neglect violates this obligation of
care because it is a failure to "care for" the enterprise and its
shareholders. Equally important, a director acting out of self-interest
(disloyalty) or out of a motive other than the interest of the corporate
enterprise and shareholders (bad faith), also is failing to "care for" the
proper interests.
Third, it can be seen from this that care and loyalty are not, in
fact, wholly distinct concepts but are instead interrelated, both as social
norms and legal duties. This means there is only a fuzzy dividing line
between them, primarily because the devotion dimension of loyalty
encompasses that critical aspect of care seen, for example, in the Good
Samaritan (director) "taking care of" and "caring for" the appropriate
object of his concern. Therefore, the legal duty of loyalty potentially
includes dimensions of the robust social norm of care not
encompassed in the more anemic legal duty of care (i.e., to act
procedurally "with care").
A starting point for probing the meanings of care and loyalty can
be simply to ask students what they think those ideas mean.' The last
couple of years I did this in class before we read anything in the
31. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
32. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 338, 640 (1986).
33. SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
34. As Kellye Testy put it: "[W]hat do 'care' and 'loyalty' really mean?" Testy, supra
note 6, at 1039.
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casebook about the "duties" of care and loyalty. In this way, students
are not yet thinking like lawyers (fortunately!) and, so, are free to range
a bit in their thinking. A few questions can draw them out. For
example, on loyalty: "What are the qualities of a loyal spouse or
friend?" "Does loyalty mean only nonbetrayal, or does it include
devotion of some sort-always, sometimes, when?" "Can you provide
an example to help us see your thinking?" "Can devotion to one
person conflict with devotion to another?" "Then what?"
A few questions on care might, for example, be the following:
"What does the notion of 'care' mean to you?" "Does that notion have
different meanings?" "When we say, for example, that someone is
undera doctor's care, does that mean the same thing as when we say a
boss takes good care ofhis workers?"
"And, when we say that a woman deeply cares for her son, do we
mean the same thing as when we say a manager handled a particular
matter with care, or the same thing as when we say a boss takes good
care othis workers?"35
Another approach for exploring the concepts of care and loyalty
is to expose students to nonlegal treatments of them. Obvious sources
are literature and dramatic works. William J. Bennett's work, The
Book of Virtues, collects numerous short, classic works on loyalty."
Recently, French philosopher Andr6 Comte-Sponville's book, A Small
Treatise on the Great Vftues, was translated into English. 7 This book
is his effort to show that, although traditional foundations of morality
have weakened, people still think in moral categories. The thirteen-
page essay on "Fidelity" (loyalty), for example, is a bit philosophical
but gives good return for the effort." In one passage he elaborates on
how
35. A recent instance where "care" was used in two related but distinctive ways is the
description by Ms. China Gorman, Chief Operating Officer of Lee Hecht Harrison, a global
outplacement firm, of how employees of a Fortune 500 company responded to large layoffs
sensitively handled by transition coaches hired for all division presidents:
The general feeling among the people being laid off was that they were being well
cared for.... The care that the company took in planning and communicating the
downsizing seemed to communicate to the folks leaving that the company wanted
to do this very difficult thing in the very best way they could.
Sara Terry, Why Workers Maintain (ainsAmid Losses, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24,
2001, at 13 (emphasis added and quotations omitted) (quoting Ms. Gorman).
36. THE BOOK OFViRTUES 663-737 (William J. Bennett ed., 1993).
37. ANDRt CO TE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREArIsE ON THE GlaATViRrTuS (Catherine
Temerson trans., 2001) (1996).
38. Seeid. at 16-29.
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fidelity allows us to adhere... to the historicity of a value, to an always
particular presence within us of the past, whether it be the collective
past of humanity (culture and civilization, the things that separate us
from barbarism) or a more individual past .... The point is not to
betray what humanity has made of itself and, in the process, of us. 9
That puts a broader, less bargain-hungry slant on loyalty!
Comte-Sponville also includes essays on "Compassion" and
"Mercy" that can broaden a student's understanding of "care.'
Personally, however, I think it is hard to beat the short biblical story of
the Good Samaritan to convey a richer perspective on what it means
for someone to inconvenience himself and "take care of" another
person when those who should have done so did not. Finally, I think
Comte-Sponville's short essay on "Good Faith" is the ozzytreatment of
that central legal concept to meaningfully inform me as to what,
substantively, it actually means:
[S]omeone of good faith says what he believes, though he may be
wrong, and believes what he says. That is why good faith is a faith, in
both senses of the term-belief and fidelity .... [S]incerity means not
lying to others; good faith means lying neither to others nor to
oneself ...
... Good faith means loving truth more than oneself....
... [At the same time], flinging the truth at someone who never
asked to hear it, who cannot bear to live with it, who is pained and
crushed by it is not an act of good faith but an act of brutality, of
insensitivity, of violence.'
This is rich, thought-provoking material for persons who countless
times in their professional lives will be called on to counsel someone
that he or she must act in "good faith."
Even if we do not ask students to read or observe treatments of
care, loyalty, and good faith outside the law, our handling of these
subjects with our students will be enriched if we draw ideas from
nontraditional (for law school) sources. Recounting our own
experiences of care and loyalty, or a lack thereof, may place those
ideas in a broader light. Another method is to draw from the artistic or
literary realms to broaden our own thinking. One brief example: as a
relatively new opera fan, I recently saw in Verdi's 11 Trovatore an
39. Id. at 25-26.
40. See id at 103-3 1.
41. Id at 195-97, 206-07.
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example of loyalty as affirmative devotion. Leonora offers herself to
Count di Luna in exchange for the Count sparing the life of his rival,
her beloved Manrico. Manrico initially curses Leonora for "selling"
her love, but when the poison she secretly swallowed takes hold and
Manrico sees the distress caused by his response to Leonora's
sacrificial act, he understands the extent of her deep devotion to him.
Moral language suits Leonora's actions-we can rightly speak of her
loyalty. She is loyal in more than the nonbetrayal sense-she is fully
loyal in her commitment to Manrico's well-being.
My point is simple. Corporate law casebooks rather abruptly
introduce and portray care, loyalty, and good faith in a highly
specialized way. These are, however, not simply legal qualities; they
are moral qualities, and resilient ones at that. Students are never really
asked to contrast corporate law's use of these notions with their own
pre-law understandings or with existent cultural depictions of these
notions. Will a more multidisciplinary approach to fiduciary discourse
in the law school classroom necessarily make lawyers better at
counseling directors in a way that will lead directors to make more
socially responsible decisions? Of course, there is no guarantee. Nor
will it automatically settle tough issues in corporate law, such as who
are the proper recipients of director care and loyalty, broadly
understood. But how we phrase and frame subjects in language
matters immensely. As James Hunter puts it: "Language itself
provides horizons for our moral imaginations." 2 Some of the social
responsibility issues that plague us as teacher/scholars may have new
light shed on them if we invite the next generation, our students, to
think broadly and novelly about topics that are, in some ways, quite
conventional 3
In corporate law teaching, in short, we can introduce students to
corporate law discourse through words that are technical, professional,
and lacking any connection to the larger social milieu; in other words,
we can have a small horizon. Similarly, we can convert the customary
doctrinal terms into the vocabulary of the new bargain model of social
42. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER 24 (2000).
43. Business schools also must address how they frame these issues for their
students-future influential corporate decision makers. Recently, The Wall Street Journal
reported the views of certain business leaders and public interest groups that graduate
business schools must emphasize corporate responsibility and stewardship as well as profits.
See Ronald Alsop, Corporations Stil Put Profits Frst, But Social Concerns Gain Ground,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2001, at B12. The Aspen Institute, for example, advocates integrating
corporate responsibility into the core curriculum, not just electives, to reach all students. See
id. Without such efforts in business schools, "enlightened" legal advice will fall on deaf ears.
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relations. Alternatively, we can appreciate, as Alan Wolfe did, that
loyalty (and care and good faith) have "not disappeared in America.
Instead, Americans are called upon to determine for themselves what
loyalty means-and to do so precisely at the time when some of their
major institutions act as if loyalty means nothing much at all,' We in
teaching are also free to decide what corporate law's core terms mean.
Indeed, corporate law doctrine provides a ready-made, substantive
entry point for infusing enriched, culturally renegotiated, social under-
standings of care, loyalty, and good faith into corporate decisions. This
largely remains the work of directors and their lawyers, but horizons
can be extended or diminished in the classroom. Moreover, courts,
notably the courts of Delaware, still use and place enormous
significance on these words in resolving corporate clashes. They
remain central to the grammar of corporate law. I think student
command of that language can only be improved by helping them see
what the core terms do and do not mean, what they could and could
not mean, and maybe even what they should and should not mean. I
think it is our social responsibility as teachers to find new ways to hold
open our students' field of vision on corporate responsibility.
44. WOLFE, supra note 7, at 61.
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